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The paper presents the results of a study of policy instrument form 
choice in four Western European countries. Based on an analysis of 
major pieces of legislation during the period, it is argued that 
various forms of institutional change in the form of delegation were 
the policy of choice for decision-makers in mitigating the effects of 
the financial crisis. Newly created agencies and funds enjoyed a 
significant degree of bureaucratic autonomy. In a parallel process, 
a gradual transformation of extant financial regulation 
contributed to an upheaval in the ideational structure that 
underpinned these policy areas for almost three decades. In this, a 
shift from price and fiscal stability to financial stability signalled a 
new set of goals for decision-makers, and a realignment of policy 
instruments duly followed. The results indicate that exogenous 
shocks—such as financial crises—initiate policy change with 
distinct policy instrument choices and delegations. 
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“For since in some Governments the Law-making Power is not 
always in being, and is usually too numerous, 
and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to 
Execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and 
so by laws to provide for all Accidents and Necessities 
that may concern the public; (...) 
therefore there is a latitude left to the Executive Power, 
to do many things of choice, which the Laws do not prescribe.” 
 
John Locke 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of the theoretical problem of bureaucratic delegation is larger 
than ever.2 The cost of the bailouts of financial services firms in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis of 2008-2009 resulted in multi-billion dollar checks for the 
taxpayers of the United States, Britain and many other countries. The 
management of these funds was mostly delegated to government bureaucracies 
and independent agencies, such as central banks. This is important because the 
institutional structure in which these financial restructurings are undertaken 
provides strong incentives for and restricts the agency of individual legislators, 
officials of the executive branch and bureaucrats. Therefore, the “quality of state 
regulation of the economy should depend on the institutional design of state 
institutions” (Przeworski 2003, 214). 
 
During their respective crisis situations the legislatures and governments of 
advanced industrialized countries (heretofore AICs) created new bureaucratic 
structures that do not pass the eyeball test established by the dominant, 
rational choice-inspired literature on delegation.3 A cursory look at the political 
debates surrounding the bailout legislations in AICs in 2008 will show that the 
level (or degree, I use these terms interchangeably) and structure of delegation 
(taken together: the dependent variables of this article) are shaped by a number 
of considerations that are not closely related to the rational choice inspired 
variables related to party politics. These outcomes are in a stark contrast with 
the extant theoretical literature that postulates that both the level and structure 
of bureaucratic delegation is defined by factors associated with divided/unified 
government (or the institutional fragmentation of government), here defined by 
the parties in charge of the separate branches of government.  
 
This article is but a first step towards outlining a general comparative 
framework of bureaucratic delegation that offers a solution to this puzzle. In 
this respect, this is more of an exercise in theory building than theory testing. I 
undertake this task in four steps. First, I present a baseline rational choice 
institutionalist model of bureaucratic delegation as well as an alternative rooted 
in the concept of trusteeship and bureaucratic delegation. Second, I present a 
small-n comparative case study design that is applicable to the investigation of 
major pieces of legislation. In the third section I demonstrate on the banks 
bailouts of 2008 in four Western European countries that such an alternative 
hypothesis holds up well vis-à-vis the applied baseline model. The final section 
concludes. 
 
 
2 TWO MODELS OF DELEGATION-BASED POLICY CHANGE AND THE 
CASE OF BANK BAILOUTS 
 
2.1 The baseline model 
 
In the political system policy change comes in different shapes and forms. One 
aspect of utmost importance is changes in the underlying institutional 
structure, which leads to the study of factors defining “institutional design”. 
                                                 
2 I am thankful for the helpful suggestions of two anonymous reviewers, as well as participants of 
the relevant sections at the Southern Political Science Association annual conference and the 
International Conference on Public Policy. All remaining errors are my own.  
3 See e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran (1999); Huber and Shipan (2002) – for an overview see Huber 
and Shipan (2006). 
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Despite the importance of the origins of institutions for policy outcomes, 
“theoretical work on this crucial issue continues to be sketchy at best” (Pierson 
2004, 103). That said, approaches associated with rational choice 
institutionalism (RCI), or with “actor-centred functionalism”, are “prominent in 
much of the work social scientists have done on formal institutions” (Ibid., 105).  
 
Within this paradigm, the most widely used baseline model exploring the logic 
of bureaucratic change in the context of delegation was developed by Epstein 
and O’Halloran (1999). The core idea is an emphasis on unified/divided 
government as a critical factor in explaining the shape and degree of delegation. 
The authors put forward a sophisticated formal model and a rigorous empirical 
research strategy; a combination that generated a decade-long research 
program with substantial results (see Epstein et al. 2009). Their research 
showed, inter alia, how divided government lowers executive branch discretion. 
Statistically significant results included a clear shift towards more constraints 
on delegated authority during transitions from unified to divided government.  
 
Nevertheless, this approach is not without its limitations, especially when it 
comes to the case of financial regulation and bank bailouts. As the legal 
environment of finance is thoroughly shaped by legislation during and in the 
wake of crisis periods one could argue that the whole issue area of financial 
regulation and supervision should be exempted from the baseline model. And 
an unambiguous definition and clear delineation of crisis periods is a necessary 
precondition for this (see the section on empirical strategy).  
 
These definitional uncertainties notwithstanding, the unique position of bailout 
legislations is reinforced by the fact that the politics of finance is inherently 
highly technical, involving a large degree of information asymmetry. In this 
respect it is important to note that Epstein and O’Halloran (1999, 75) argue that 
high policy uncertainty does, in fact, imply a unique reaction: “The more 
uncertainty associated with a policy area, the more likely Congress is to 
delegate authority to the executive.” That said, the devil is in the details.  
 
First, in the baseline model uncertainty is a function of the policy area, not of 
exogenous shocks. My point here is that the degree of uncertainty may 
substantively vary within the boundaries of a single-issue area. Second, Epstein 
and O’Halloran do make the claim that “during times of divided government, 
Congress will delegate more often to independent agencies” (IA), which 
suggests that even when uncertainty is high the first best option of Congress is 
to delegate policy instrument choice to IAs.  
 
What follows from all this is an extension of the notion of policy uncertainty, 
which, now, is understood as a function of the related issue area and exogenous 
shocks. In these cases, extremely volatile situations, associated with an extreme 
degree of uncertainty (Epstein and O’Halloran’s ω), become an irregular sub-
type of the more general case of high policy uncertainty. On the one hand, for 
cases of high policy uncertainty, the authors’ propositions may or may not hold. 
On the other hand, for cases of extremely high policy uncertainty (crisis)—and 
this is the gist of Proposition 3, to be introduced below—they do not hold as 
these decisions are reached under a different mode of representative 
government.  
 
Following this logic, what I offer here is a resolution to the anomaly of 
extremely high policy uncertainty in the baseline model of delegation. The 
supposedly alternative approach of this article, then, presents itself more of a 
natural extension or refinement of Epstein and O’Halloran’s original offering.  
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2.2 An alternative model: The causal logic of crisis-driven delegation 
 
The causal logic against which this alternative explanation, crisis-driven 
delegation unfolds is as follows. In a crisis situation pre-existing bureaucratic 
capacities render general legislative, and even committee capacity strongly 
dominated while the short time frame highlights the advantages of relying more 
heavily on ex post oversight. So far this is more or less in line with standard 
assumptions in RCI delegation theory. The paths diverge, however, once the 
very question of bureaucratic structure is relegated to irrelevance by elected 
decision makers yearning for a quick solution that helps avoiding a complete 
collapse of the financial system. The two main elements, therefore, that 
vindicate an autonomy-based—as opposed to a mandate-based—perspective 
are the political implications of crisis and the politicians’ rational reaction to 
these implications. Put bluntly, they need a trustee to clean up the mess and 
choose the instruments they deem necessary to do so, while they steer away 
from the blame potentially associated with it.  
 
As to the first point, crisis upsets theoretical frameworks fine-tuned to 
normalcy. Budget appropriations, for instance, are rendered useless as a 
metrics of the level of delegation as they are extremely sensitive to exogenous 
factors such as the depth of crisis (i.e. budgetary allocations could exclusively be 
the function of the size of non-performing assets). A corollary to this point is 
that crisis decisions are made in a larger than usual stakeholder environment 
due to the high stakes and high uncertainty involved (as was pointed out by 
Baumgartner and Jones 2009).  
 
Furthermore, the bureaucratic structure emerging after crisis legislation may 
differ from pieces of law adopted in a “going concern” status because of its 
temporary nature. Extraordinary lines of credit, such as those provided through 
the discount window, a ban on shorting or the suspension of convertibility 
involve a degree of discretionality on behalf of trustees that is seldom present in 
under normal circumstances. Rational politicians carefully adapt to these new 
circumstances. 
 
2.3 Propositions 
 
Based on these considerations alternative hypotheses rooted in crisis driven 
delegation may be formulated for the purposes of a comparative study of non-
presidential systems of government. The baseline model (Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999, 78) generates 9 hypotheses but only a couple of them relates 
to the problem at hand. An adaptive reformulation of these propositions yields 
two basic propositions. According to the theorem on the level of delegation less 
discretionary authority will be delegated to the executive during times of a 
more fragmented government. And the proposition on the structure of 
delegation states that as the effective number of vetoes increases, the polity 
becomes more fragmented and the probability of delegation to independent 
agencies (as opposed to cabinet departments) increases as well.  
 
I also put forth an alternative hypothesis, one that is optimized for the crisis 
mode of representative government; that is, delegation-based policy choice 
under extreme policy uncertainty. According to this proposition on blank-
cheque delegation to trustees in times of crisis the beneficiary of legislative 
delegation is a trustee-type institution. This implies that standard principal-
agent models of delegation are not applicable to these cases: the degree and 
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structure of delegation is shaped by the crisis and not party politics, and policy 
choice gets liberated from pre-existing constraints.  
 
In the following I examine the relative merits of these propositions in light of 
the European bank bailouts of the late 2000s. Bank bailouts are defined in a 
general sense as a coherent set of short-term policy response to a standalone or 
systemic banking crisis. This definition is in line with the more general notion 
that bailouts are “instances when the government aids one or more 
economically distressed businesses in some way” (Wright 2010, 1). As for the 
definition of bank bailouts proper, the notion of coherence deserves further 
elaboration. It is important because bailouts usually constitute complex policy 
packages. Among the policy tools deployed during financial crises Aït-Sahalia et 
al. (2010) count fiscal policy, monetary policy, liquidity support, financial sector 
policies and policy inaction/ad hoc bailouts. For the purposes of the present 
discussion I will focus on “financial sector policies”, steps such as 
recapitalization, asset purchases and liability guarantees—all of which are 
easily distinguishable in larger packages of policy initiatives.  
 
 
3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND CASE SELECTION 
 
In light of the theoretical and definitional considerations of the previous 
sections, the primary aim of this article is not theory testing, but theory building 
(adaptation and extension). Gerring (2004) makes a compelling argument for 
qualitative case studies that have more “affinity” towards an “exploratory” 
strategy of research. This approach sets its aim at “theory generation” and the 
exploration of “causal effects”. In my quest to establish a coherent relationship 
between the ends and means of research I rely on the qualitative approach of a 
small N cross-sectional comparisons that controls for a number of possible 
confounds. That said, the above hypotheses can be easily reformulated for the 
purposes of a future large N research design as–according to Gerring–the two 
are not “antagonistic approaches to the empirical world” (see Conclusion).  
 
The research design involves four brief case studies, based on the “method of 
difference” principle. The British, French, German and Dutch financial markets, 
government structures and the actual bailout strategies implemented in the 
heat of the crisis have a lot in common and, therefore, form an adequate group 
of cases for such an analysis. The countries in the sample are all AICs, which 
retain a substantial degree of financial policy sovereignty and thus the capacity 
to influence the behaviour of major actors based in the core of the world 
economy (same is not true of e.g. small open economies with privatized bank 
sectors in Central and Eastern Europe).  
 
All cases in the sample have bicameral legislative bodies with a relatively minor 
role for the upper chamber. The government structure is unitary in all except 
for Germany. Besides the U.K., all sample countries are part of the euro zone. 
That said, this splendid isolation of Britain does not weaken, but, in fact, 
reinforces the general argument (see the section on the independent variables). 
By focusing on the simultaneous bank bailout legislations of 2008 we can also 
keep time constant through the cases. Indeed, apart from being the “most 
similar” cases, the U.K France, Germany and the Netherlands are convenient 
choices as the bank rescue packages were almost simultaneously adopted–a 
further step towards the natural experiment ideal-type (the UK was an early 
frontrunner with a first Banking Act in February 2008). The units of analysis in 
this sense are major pieces of legislation that were widely considered to be 
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“bank bailout packages”. These bailout programs are laws adopted by the 
legislature of each country, which also laid the groundwork for further 
“delegated legislation” (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1: SHORT TERM “BAILOUT PACKAGES” IN 2008 
 
 
A final factor reinforcing the internal validity of the framework is that the 
Treasury/Ministry of Finance and the central banks play a large and, more 
importantly, somewhat similar role in banking supervision in all countries, 
along with the respective financial services watchdogs (the ECB was seemingly 
not a source of variation with regards to national bailout efforts directed at 
individual financial institutions). 
 
3.1 Dependent variables 
 
The two initial propositions introduced above pertain to a major factor in 
shaping policy choice, the level and structure of bureaucratic delegation. All 
things considered, while Epstein and O’Halloran’s choice of a more substantial 
metrics—which they obtain by coding the net discretionary authorities in 
relevant pieces of law—is vindicated, its return-on-investment ratio is arguably 
lower than that of the less complex measures. I opt, therefore, for three 
alternative measures of delegated authority: the length of laws; agency 
autonomy; and budget authorizations.  
 
First, the non-substantive method adopted by Mayhew (1991) spawned a 
number of similarly procedural “brute force” methods. One with a substantively 
large impact is the word count method of Huber et al. (2001). The authors offer 
a simple measure: The number of words in new text circumscribing the 
responsibilities of the bureaucracy. In the context of the present research the 
length of the pieces of legislation in question should be indicative of the extent 
of control measures, and therefore the limits on delegation built into the 
legislation. The length of laws, therefore, will serve as one of the dependent 
variables in this informal model. 
 
Second, a similarly useful proxy presents itself in the form of institutional 
independence measures (for an overview see Iversen and Soskice 2006). In the 
case of European central banks Quaglia (2008, 6) provides a detailed 
comparative assessment of institutional autonomy based on a metrics of legal 
provisions, policy capacity, legitimacy etc. A similar study was undertaken by 
Gilardi (2008) for independent regulatory agencies. As analogous indices have 
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been developed with respect to all-important units of the government structure, 
research into the extent of delegation can benefit from this literature. Degree 
and structure overlap in these studies: a non-majoritarian agency, such as an 
independent central bank (form) enjoys more autonomy (degree).  
 
Epstein and O’Halloran (1999, 80) go on to define 5 subtypes: the Executive 
Office of the President (EOP); cabinet departments (CD); independent agencies 
(IA – such as central bank authorities or –financial supervisory agencies); 
independent regulatory commissions (IRC); and government corporations (GC). 
Each of these organizational units is associated with a level of initial discretion 
(and, taken together, they form a “bureaucratic structure” – Ibid., 156). This 
classification by and large lends itself well to generalization to non-presidential 
separation of power systems. This leaves us with a binary dependent variable 
for the structure but also that of the degree of autonomous policy choice: 
independent/non-majoritarian agencies (IAs and IRCs) and majoritarian 
agencies (EOPs, CDs, GCs). 
 
Finally, perhaps the most straightforward measure of the degree of delegation 
ingrained in policy choice is the level of budget authorizations/appropriations 
granted to the executive branch. In this respect, nominal figures seem less 
useful than measures relative, for example, to the size of the GDP of the country 
or total budgetary outlays. This metrics will serve as the third dependent 
variable in the verbal model.4 
 
3.2 Independent variables  
 
The key to the translation of Epstein and O’Halloran’s divided/unified 
government variable to a parliamentary setting is the definition of 
fragmentation. In this article, by this I mean the effective number of veto points 
(ENV).5 It is important to note that the number of effective vetoes is not 
necessarily constant in a given polity over time. In a quasi-formal rendition this 
means that ENV is a function of the number of parties in parliament; the 
number of coalition partners; the ideological distance between said parties on 
the one hand; and the relatively fixed institutional characteristics of the polity 
on the other. The inclusion of these general regime characteristics is certainly 
not unprecedented in the literature on the politics of bailouts (see e.g. Rosas 
2009).  
 
Given the change in the background variable of regimes it should come as no 
surprise that the original independent variables of the model by Epstein and 
O’Halloran are not directly applicable. First, they are based on two sources of 
                                                 
4 While these quantitative measures have a distinct competitive advantage over less concrete 
metrics, the abovementioned scales are not without downsides. For there is a real trade-off 
between more objective quantitative measures that are “blind” to the saliency of a single line in 
a mass of text and qualitative interpretations of the saliency of the same line item that inevitable 
retain an element of subjectivity. The local administrative practices of the sample countries, for 
instance, may affect the actual wording of bills, just as the degree to which MPs rely on informal 
“fire alarms” as opposed to formal oversight mechanisms that are built in the legislation ex ante. 
In the face of these and similar conundrums the best strategy is to hedge our bets and rely on a 
number of metrics. 
5 This formulation establishes a direct link between the U.S.-focused approach of Epstein and 
O’Halloran and a similar, comparative analysis by Cox and McCubbins (2001). Both directly 
relate to the book by Tsebelis (2002), who popularized the term „veto players”. The basic idea is 
the same in all these works: political systems consist of veto players and/or points which taken 
together largely define policy outcomes or „winsets”. Cox and McCubbins further emphasize 
that institutional characteristics (the degree of the „separation of powers”) are just as important 
as the players controlling these veto points („separation of purpose”).  
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variation: policy uncertainty and political uncertainty. For our current purposes 
only the latter is relevant as in this article I do not address problems related to 
the policy uncertainty principle. In line with the approach of Huber and Shipan 
(2006, 262) “the issue type is held constant”.  
 
As for political uncertainty the selection of explanatory variables in the baseline 
model offers a less obvious fit for non-presidential systems still. The various 
metrics put forward by Epstein and O’Halloran to gauge the effect of a binary 
notion of divided/unified government are only partially useful: the basic 
dichotomy less, the more complex ones, based on seat shares amongst others, 
more so. As co-habitation is rare in some semi-presidential systems (e.g. 
France); just as one-party governments in PR-parliamentarism (e.g. Germany, 
Netherlands); and most of the time divided government is not applicable to 
Westminster style parliamentarism (e.g. UK – except for cases of a “hung 
parliament”6); the binary approach seems to have a limited purchase on the 
cases in the sample. That said, the introduction of ENV offers a promising 
variable on a mid-range level of abstraction that may resolve these issues 
related to the operationalization of fragmentation.  
 
All things considered–and with an eye on keeping the discussion as simple as 
possible while retaining a significant degree of explanatory power–in this 
article I use three proxies for measuring ENV/political fragmentation. Of these 
one varies and two others are fixed on the short term. The first one is a more 
nuanced version of the divided government variable (with values: unified; 
mixed; and coalition; “mixed” being a coalition with a dominant party). Besides 
this I rely on two institutional variables. The first one is the degree of separation 
of powers, which is self-explanatory (it is the key to understanding the baseline 
model). The second is the proportionality of the electoral system, which (via 
Duverger’s “law”) is more conducive to coalition governments as opposed to 
single party governments. These also may take the values high, mixed and low 
and are summed up in Table 2.  
 
TABLE 2: GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION 
 
Note: Data refers to the proportionality (%) of the electoral system.  
Source: Iversen and Soskice (2006, 176). 
 
The rationale for using electoral systems as a proxy is that–more often than 
not–they are “associated with a distinct party system” (Iversen and Soskice 
2006, 167) and, therefore, are widely used to account for the emergence of 
coalition governments. An example for this choice in the context of financial 
regulation is provided by Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003): based on evidence 
from twenty-two industrialized countries, they argue that “the political 
dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and 
extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking 
cartels.”  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Then again, this is a rare occasion, occurring just once between 1929 and 2009; and for a limited 
period of 9 months. 
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4 EVIDENCE FROM FOUR EU COUNTRIES 
 
Having introduced the propositions and the theoretical and operationalized 
variables, along with the empirical strategy designed to gauge the cause-effect 
relationship between them, the final step before turning to the actual cases is a 
preliminary analysis of the hypotheses. Crude as this analysis is, my expectation 
is that a more refined/quantitative probe into both sides of the equation would 
point toward the same conclusion. Furthermore, if an analysis of empirical 
phenomena based on such rudimentary measures signals a tension between the 
model/propositions and actual decisions further inquiries with regards to both 
model and measurement would be in order. 
 
Based on the abovementioned two institutional proxies, the degree of 
separation of powers and electoral systems, a rank order may be established for 
our sample starting with the UK and ending with The Netherlands, and with 
France and Germany in between (the latter being closer to the pole that signals 
more fragmentation). This rank order is also in line with the one used by Cox 
and McCubbins (2001) who put Germany (unified power/separated purpose) 
and France in the middle of the spectrum with the completely unified UK on 
one, and the extremely fragmented US at the other end of the spectrum.  
  
In the final analysis I subsume the three independent variables under three 
categories–low, mixed, and high fragmentation–each with a different prognosis 
for the outcomes generated from the model. The British and Dutch cases are 
straightforward: The former constitutes the low-fragmentation, the latter the 
high-fragmentation end of the spectrum. Based on the results of the 2005 
election the Labour Party held 356 of the 646 seats of the House of Commons. In 
the Netherlands the fourth government of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende 
was based on a grand coalition formed in 2006 between the centre-right CDA 
(41) and CU (6), and the centre-left PvdA (33).7 This coalition had a thin 
majority of 80 in a 150-seat Lower House.  
 
From the cases with a hybrid institutional structure France shows a relatively 
low-fragmentation as in the period in question it was ruled by a coalition 
established in 2007 and dominated by the party of the president and the prime 
minister.8 Germany, on the other hand, is a relatively high-fragmentation case 
as it was governed by a grand coalition of CDU-CSU (226) and SPD (222) with 
other majority coalitions available in a Bundestag of 614 seats. As a grand 
coalition–almost by definition–indicates a larger-than-usual policy distance 
between its constitutive parties Germany is closer to the Dutch case. Moreover, 
this position is reinforced by an institutional factor, the larger than usual role 
for the second chamber, the Bundesrat in policy-making. While a relatively high 
degree of covariance between these variables is more than probable, my 
expectation is that this will not affect substantively these general findings.  
 
If the propositions about non-presidential separation of powers systems are 
correct, they would have the following observable implications: the highest 
degree of delegation in policy choices is expected in the UK, followed by France 
with its less unified government due to a coalition in the National Assembly. A 
grand coalition in Germany, and especially the multiparty grand coalition 
                                                 
7 In the brackets are the seats attained in the Lower House. 
8 François Fillon’s second government was supported by 345 of 577 deputies of which 313-a 
simple majority-were sitting in the group of president Sarkozy’s party, the UMP. 
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government in the Netherlands signals a more fragmented polity and, therefore, 
less delegation—and to more independent agencies.  
 
In a similar vein, in the UK and France a less fragmented government implies 
delegation to executive branch departments as opposed to Germany and the 
Netherlands where the extended version of the equilibrium of Epstein and 
O’Halloran’s model suggests more delegation to independent agencies. By 
contrast, if we find evidence in the political debates/voting data about agency 
design, that the eventual institutional choice was informed by considerations 
regarding trusteeship, blank-cheques and the like, as opposed to fragmentation, 
this would weaken the hypotheses that build on these purely political variables.  
 
4.1 UK 
 
The outlier UK data is seemingly in line with Proposition 1 as it occurred in a 
less fragmented political environment. A forceful case can be made, however, 
that this data is but a reflection of the depth of the underlying financial crisis 
and have nothing to do with executive-legislative relations.9 As far as anecdotal 
evidence goes, insider accounts overwhelmingly confirm this latter 
interpretation.  
 
As for the structure of delegation, the British case is relatively straightforward 
and is in line with the prognosis of the baseline model. With relatively few veto 
points the government had a free hand to craft a series of executive decrees 
pertaining to various policy choices. Timing also had a major impact: A 
makeshift Banking Act had already been approved due to the early collapse of 
Northern Rock. This opened up some space for executive discretion before a 
new, supposedly long-term regulation could have been put in place. By October 
2008 an early draft of this new proposal (to be voted on in early 2009) was 
already introduced in the House of Commons.  
 
That said, demands with regard to “more information about Labour’s blank 
cheque” were certainly not uncommon weeks into the bailout as “despite 
repeated requests (…) Parliament (had) still not been given a chance to 
consider” these momentous events.10 In the meantime a majoritarian agency, 
the UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI)—“a company wholly-owned by 
the Government”—was established to manage the holdings acquired by the 
bailouts. In summary, the UK case by and large conforms to the baseline model, 
except for the length of the eventual legislation, as the emphasis of Proposition 
3 on ex post oversight is verified by the length of the Banking Act of 2009. 
Nevertheless, the second Banking Act was a hybrid of short-term crisis 
management and “long-term” resolution that puts the usefulness of the word 
count metrics into question.  
 
4.2 France 
 
In France, a less-than-fragmented political elite propped up an obscure credit-
refinancing agency (SRAEC) to create La Société de financement de l'économie 
française (SFEF). A unique feature of this arrangement was that it was a 
                                                 
9 Dey, Iain: How the government bailout saved our banks, The Sunday Times, October 3, 2009. 
Available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_fin 
ance/article6860385.ece. 
10 Forsyth, Michael: Financial crisis: Bail-out questions that must be answered, The Daily 
Telegraph, October 24, 2008. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/fi 
nancialcrisis/3255946/Financial-crisis-Bail-out-questions-that-must-be-answered.html. 
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government corporation as opposed to a cabinet department agency, which 
created the possibility of private entities (banks) acquiring a majority presence 
on the board. This outcome somewhat contradicts Proposition 2 as a unified 
government implied that executive should have dominated the emerging 
bureaucratic structure. Furthermore, the SFEF was a garden-variety short-term 
bailout institution as it has been “put to sleep” by statute (by the law “La Loi de 
Finance 2010”)11 in less than two years and very much in line with the original 
intentions.  
 
4.3 Germany  
 
In Germany both chambers of the parliament adopted a bailout package with 
two smaller opposition parties, the Left and the Greens, opposing the bill in the 
Bundestag.12 The Bundesrat, the upper chamber, that consists of the 
representatives of 16 state governments, passed the bill unanimously. This 
indicated that the upper chamber–just as in all other sample cases—was not an 
effective veto point once the decision had been made in the lower chamber. The 
bureaucratic structure or the level of capital injection played a secondary role in 
the debate with executive-legislative relations being a hot button issue: “It’s a 
500-billion-euro blank cheque,” said Greens caucus chief Renate Kuenast.  
 
The newly created Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung (SoFFin) has been 
managed by the Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation. Seemingly, 
this is an independent agency in Epstein and O’Halloran’s nomenclature (an 
“independent public-law institution” as it was defined), which would confirm 
Proposition 2. A closer look, however, reveals that the “Management 
Committee” consisted of three members who were appointed by the Federal 
Ministry of Finance in consultation with the Deutsche Bundesbank. Also, the 
agency was “subject to the legal and technical oversight of the Federal Ministry 
of Finance” and the Federal Ministry of Finance was “politically responsible for 
the decisions of the FMSA.”13 With the ties close to the Ministry of Finance as 
they were, the German case does not adequately corroborate Proposition 2.  
 
4.4 The Netherlands 
 
While the case France and Germany show a mixed picture the case of The 
Netherlands is particularly puzzling. A grand coalition was in charge of crisis 
management, with Wouter Bos, a deputy prime minister/finance minister from 
the junior partner Labour party taking the lead.14 In a mechanical application of 
the baseline model this politically shaky setup is supposed to lead to lengthy 
bills and delegation to independent agencies. What happened, on the contrary, 
was a hands-on approach by the government relying mostly on its decree 
powers with only ex post legislation and oversight taking place on behalf of 
parliament.  
                                                 
11 Available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/budget/plf2010/b1967-tIII-a17.asp#P335 
4_314065. 
12 Deutsche Welle Staff Report: German Lawmakers Pass Bank Rescue Package, Deutsche Welle, 
October 17, 2008. Available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3719946,00.html. 
13 Structure of the SoFFin and the FMSA, The Official Website of SofFin. Available at http://www.s 
offin.de/en/soffin/structure/index.html. 
14 It is important to note that—besides trustee-type institutions such as central banks, and their 
respective chairpersons—finance and treasury ministers/secretaries enjoyed an enlarged role 
in most developed countries. They gained authority and responsibility vis-á-vis other cabinet 
members (especially those responsible for the social functions of the state). This point 
reinforces the argument for a closed-circle, technocratic decision-making during times of crisis. 
I thank the anonymous reviewer for explicitly highlighting this development. 
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On September 28, 2008 Fortis had been bailed out in a coordinated effort 
between the governments of Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The Dutch 
government on October 9 then declared that a €20 billion fund was created to 
strengthen the equity of the financial sector. During the week of October 13 the 
Dutch government initiated of €200 billion guarantee for interbank 
lending. And finally, during the week of October 20 the Dutch state took a stake 
in ING Group's core capital in the form of securities, amounting to €10 billion 
and Aegon received a capital injection from the government over €3 billion. All 
this was managed by the Agentschap van de Generale Thesaurie, which is a 
standard-issue Treasury agency and which is, as is common in the developed 
world, part of the Ministry of Finance.  
 
Furthermore, according to news reports, it was Bos who decided on October 7, 
“after consultations at a European level”, to temporarily guarantee private bank 
accounts up to €100.000. And together with Nout Wellink of the Dutch Central 
Bank, he presented a comprehensive bailout plan. While an emergency debate 
was held in the Parlement based on a first sweep of new reports statutory 
action—to my knowledge—was not taken. Perhaps this was the reason why 
cross-party support developed for an inquiry into the causes and management 
of the credit crisis.15 This “accountability” coalition stretched from the far-left to 
the far right and included all opposition parties. Besides the criticism, however, 
the letter expressed support for finance minister Bos for “putting out the fire” 
which, it said, was “of vital importance” while the crisis continued. And despite 
the sense of urgency expressed in the letter ex post parliamentary 
investigations of the government interventions only started in April 2009.16 
 
 
5 DISCUSSION  
 
The actual variables for the cases at hand are summarized in Table 3. On the 
independent variable side, the factor of choice of the baseline mode, 
fragmentation is presented. The rank order—as discussed above—draws on 
three sources: divided/unified government, government system and electoral 
system. The first of the dependent variables, the length of legislation, is based 
on Huber et al. (2001) and it is self-explanatory.  
 
TABLE 3: DELEGATION OUTCOMES 
 
Source: Author’s calculations; Iversen and Soskice 2006. 
 
 
                                                 
15 DutchNews.nl Staff Report: Cross-party support for credit crisis inquiry, DutchNews.nl, October 
29, 2008. Available at http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2008/10/crossparty_support 
_for_credit.php. 
16 Gray-Block, Aaron: Dutch to probe cause of credit crisis – reports, Reuters.com, April 15, 2009. 
Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLF53184620090415. 
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The second variable, the cost of bailouts (calculated as a proportion of GDP – 
Dermine and Schoenmaker, 2010, 3-4), deserves further elaboration. The 
financial data combines new appropriations and the discretionary funds of 
central banks. That said, the sheer size of the differences (and the Treasury-
specific costs indicated in Table 1) testifies to the comparability of the numbers. 
Finally, the third dependent variable represents the relative independence of the 
recipients of delegation from the chief executive, with values: high; mixed; and 
low. 
 
 A cursory analysis of the propositions regarding the four cases yields the 
following conclusions. According to Proposition 1 less authority is delegated 
under more fragmented governments. The results are mixed, leaning negative: 
The UK holds up well, France and the Netherlands significantly less, with 
Germany in the middle. Proposition 2 contends that under fragmented 
government independent/non-majoritarian agencies become the primary 
beneficiaries of delegation. Once again, the Netherlands and Germany are 
significant outliers, with the Treasury having a leading role in bailout efforts.  
 
Proposition 3, the alternative hypothesis derived from the theory of trustees, on 
the other hand, is upheld by the findings. The notion of blank-cheque delegation 
was a recurring theme in the debates about bailout. The level of delegation as 
measured by budget appropriation proved extremely sensitive to exogenous 
factors such as the depth of crisis. Policy coordination between European 
government agencies (as opposed to political parties) was a generally 
recognized fact. Even in the most accommodating British case parliament 
crafted a lengthy piece of legislation packed with oversight measures only after 
the worst days of the crisis–and the same happened in the Netherlands. In the 
meantime, a heavy reliance on executive decree power, a definitive sign of 
trusteeship, was the main tool of government intervention. In a similar fashion, 
the Treasury in Germany, and the Ministry of Economy (which incorporates the 
Treasury) in France was put in a decisive role in managing and supervising the 
newly created bureaucratic units. And finally, extant bureaucratic capacities 
played a major role in shaping the structure of delegation with the Treasury 
taking the initiative in all cases in the management of bailout efforts.  
 
The Dutch and German cases are particularly interesting for two reasons. First, 
grand coalitions do not seem to have the same effect as divided governments 
did in the U.S. context. Only opposition parties voted against the bailout 
measures. This indicates one of two things. Either the fragmentation-based 
analysis needs to be revised or we may accept ENV as an important factor with 
a significant modification. Coalition governments should be treated as unified 
governments with regards to landmark policy decisions. The results are the 
same: fragmentation in its present operationalization is not a useful 
explanatory variable.  
 
Divided/unified government may, in fact, be useful in the context of 
parliamentary systems under normal circumstances. Under extremely high 
degrees of policy uncertainty in the issue area of financial policy, however, 
there is a tendency to delegate the decisions regarding policy choice to the 
Treasury regardless of the underlying ENVs. The answer to the puzzle lies in 
trusteeship as an alternative to principal-agent explanations.  
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6 CONCLUSION  
 
In this article I have presented an extension and application of the “delegating 
powers” model by Epstein and O’Halloran to non-presidential systems of 
government in a specific issue area. I argued that this extension is plausible; and 
proposed the notion of fragmentation and the effective number of veto points as 
more general substitutes for the pivotal independent variable of divided 
government. The cursory overview of a basic application of this model to a 
cross-sectional sample of four AICs has produced ambiguous results indicating 
the presence of a number of possible confounds. A new proposition was offered; 
one that can account for decisions regarding policy choices under extreme 
degrees of policy uncertainty. Crisis-driven delegation, a notion based on 
trusteeship as opposed to mandates, provided a useful addition to the baseline 
model, as it was well equipped to deal with extra (exogenous) policy 
uncertainty in policy areas with a high degree of initial policy uncertainty. 
 
That said, the most important proposition of this article is that universal 
theories of legislative agency design remain elusive. The least we can say is that 
one of the most widely used and acclaimed frameworks (Epstein and 
O’Halloran’s “delegating powers”) proved to be ineffective in explaining major 
policy decisions such as agency design outcomes regardless of the level of policy 
uncertainty. On the other hand, the alternative proposal of a “blank-cheque 
delegation” in crisis situations held up well in a “ticking-bomb scenario” such as 
the case of the financial crisis of the late 2000s. This signifies the relevance of a 
novel approach, one that meets the needs of this other mode of representative 
government: the state of emergency.  
 
The concept of trusteeship provides a theoretical background against which 
testable propositions, such as Proposition 3 about the blank-cheque nature of 
crisis-driven delegation, may be generated. Even as the primary aim of this 
article was theory building, as opposed to theory testing, the crisis-driven 
delegation theory of policy instrument choice involving trustee-type 
institutions proved a promising description of policy choices in crisis situations.  
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